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"OUTING" AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS: SEXUAL
ORIENTATION'S CHALLENGE TO THE SUPREME
COURT'S CATEGORICAL JURISPRUDENCE
INTRODUCTION
No area of the law exemplifies the tension between individual
rights and concerns for the social order better than the debate be-
tween freedom of the press and the rights of individuals subjected
to the press. This debate has recently surfaced for reevaluation in
light of the growing potential for lawsuits concerning the publica-
tion of individuals' sexual orientation. As more gay newspapers
engage in "outing"' public figures by exposing their sexual orienta-
tion, the possibility of lawsuits for defamation and invasion of pri-
vacy has increased. In this legal context, sexual orientation
challenges traditional thinking about the balance between the rights
of the individual and the rights of the press.
In a series of cases decided during the 1960s, the Supreme
Court balanced the press's right to disseminate information freely
with two distinct rights of the individual-the right to maintain
one's reputation amidst false accusations (defamation suits), and the
right to prevent invasion of privacy. Beginning with New York Times,
Co. v. Sullivan,2 and continuing through Milkovich v. Lorain Journal
Co.,3 the Court developed a methodology for balancing these inter-
ests. This balance was based primarily on an epistemology of di-
chotomies and categories with vague parameters: truth/falsity, 4
public issues/private issues,5 public figure/private figure.6 Courts
and attorneys must consider this legal background when they at-
tempt to litigate and adjudicate the "outing" cases that will inevita-
bly arise.7
1 See infra notes 7-14 and accompanying text.
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3 110S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
4 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964) (the necessary proof
for libel is "actual malice-that is, with [the] knowledge that it was false").
5 See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (the con-
cern is that "true speech on matters of public concern" not be deterred); see also Anne
Benaroya, Note, Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps Revisited, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1268, 1270 (1990).
6 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) ("Public figures usually
enjoy greater access to the channels of effective communication .... Private individuals
are... more vulnerable to injury"); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155
(1967)(defining a "public figure").
7 Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) is the
first reported case that challenged the practice of "outing"-the publication of an indi-
103
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
This Note discusses the legal and jurisprudential difficulties
that the legal community will confront in cases of "outing." Part I
establishes the Court's methodological approach that "outing" ulti-
mately challenges. This Part focuses on the possible legal causes of
action available to an "outed" plaintiff, such as defamation and inva-
sion of privacy, and places "outing" in its legal and historical con-
text. Part II analyzes possible difficulties with the legal
requirements of defamation and invasion of privacy claims, and ex-
plains how "outing" presents a unique case for attorneys and for
courts. Finally, Part III offers some suggestions on how the courts
should reconfigure the legal standards and the underlying legal rea-
soning to allow "outed" plaintiffs successful causes of action under
defamation and invasion of privacy.
I
OUTING AND ITS PLACE IN THE LAW
A. Outing-What is It?
"Outing" is the intentional exposure by gay people of the sex-
ual orientation of public figures.8 Gay activists assert a number of
reasons for this exposure. Frustrated with the public indifference to
the AIDS epidemic, activists have "claim[ed] a moral right" to ex-
pose public figures' sexual orientations. 9 These activists also claim
that "outing" is a way of helping the gay rights movement by forcing
people to accept the position of role models. Additionally, "outing"
purportedly helps to eliminate opposition to gay political causes by
exposing the secret, hypocritical lives of proponents of anti-gay leg-
islation.' 0 "Outing" is accomplished through news stories in gay
publications'I which allege that the public figure, while not admit-
ting it, is in fact a homosexual.
vidual's sexual orientation. Cases have discussed an individual's sexuality in conjunc-
tion with sexual crimes (e.g., Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson, 592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.
1979)), but in these cases the police record, not a newspaper, first made the information
public. This Note explores the possible future changes in the law to accommodate the
recent trend by gay newspapers of publishing names of alleged homosexuals.
8 "Outing" comes from the notion of bringing someone "out of the closet" by
exposing that person's sexuality.
9 William A. Henry, III, Forcing Gays Out of the Closet, TiME, Jan. 29, 1990, at 67.
10 "Outing" differs from mere gossip articles in tabloids such as The National En-
quirer or The New York Post in that the motivation of the publisher is different. Gay papers
perform "outing" with the intent of supporting the gay community politically and psy-
chologically. See Outspoken, OrTWEEK, March 18, 1990, at 4 (editorial explaining reasons
for "outing" Malcolm Forbes and others in the future). Although there is no legal dis-
tinction between maliciously exposing someone's sexual orientation and doing it for
political reasons, some ethical or moral desire to differentiate the two may exist. Such a
discussion is beyond the strictly legal analysis of this Note.
11 New York City's Outweek regularly listed approximately 20 famous people they
believe to be gay in a weekly feature titled "Peek-a-Boo." Outline, a Chicago paper, is
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When Outweek magazine exposed the sexual life of Malcolm
Forbes, 12 it sparked furor and controversy within the press. Since
the Forbes article, every major newspaper in the country has run an
article debating the social and moral rationales of "outing." 13 Aside
from the social and moral issues surrounding "outing," the practice
also raises important legal issues concerning the extent of the
press's freedom as opposed to the rights of the individual. 14 "Out-
ing" raises the possibility of defamation and invasion of privacy law-
suits because it is an activity of the press performed upon an
individual.
B. An "Outed" Plaintiff's Causes of Action
An "outed" plaintiff has two avenues of legal recourse against
the publication that exposed his or her sexual orientation: defama-
tion' 5 and invasion of privacy. The state tort claim of defamation
requires that the plaintiff show the statement was published negli-
gently or intentionally to third parties and that the publication re-
sulted in damage to the plaintiff's reputation.16 Additionally, the
Supreme Court has noted that if the plaintiff is a public figure, 17 the
Constitution further requires the plaintiff to show either that the
statement is knowingly false or that the press acted with reckless
disregard for its truth.' 8
less regimented in its schedule, but often publishes articles spotlighting a public figure
and his or her sexuality.
12 Michelangelo Signorile, The Other Side of Makolm, OUTWEEK, Mar. 18, 1990, at 40.
13 See, e.g., The Ins and Outs of Outing the Ins, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12, 1991, at E12;
WASH. POST, July 13, 1990, at Cl; USA TODAY, May 7, 1990, at 1; Cm. TRiB., May 6,
1990, at 3; BOSTON GLOBE, May 3, 1990, at 1; N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1990, at A23; L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 22, 1990, at El.
14 "Outing" raises concerns about how far the press should delve into the private
lives of people to generate news stories. See Gays, Privacy and the Free Press, WASH. POST,
Apr. 8, 1990, at B7; The Ins and Outs of Outing the Ins, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12, 1991, at E12.
15 Defamation includes the torts of libel and slander. Libel is written defamation
and slander is oral. Due to my focus on the press, throughout this Note I will use defa-
mation synonymously with libel.
16 A presumption of damages, at least as it applies to media defendants, no longer
exists. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974). Exactly what con-
stitutes a defamatory statement, or lowers reputation, is a bit vague. Reputation has
been harmed when "third persons [are deterred] from associating or dealing" with the
person. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977). In Clark v. American Broad-
casting Co., 684 F.2d 1208 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040 (1983), a television
documentary on prostitution, which showed the plaintiff walking toward the camera, was
held defamatory because of the potential for a bad impression. In Haas v. Evening Dem-
ocrat Co., 107 N.W.2d 444 (Iowa 1961) the court held that calling the plaintiff conserva-
tive was not defamation because the statement did not disgrace or lower the plaintiff's
esteem in society's eyes. In Vigil v. Rice, 397 P.2d 719 (N.M. 1964), the court held that a
doctor's report to school authorities that a student was pregnant was defamatory.
17 For a discussion of "public figures," see infra notes 91-95 and accompanying
text.
18 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (the plaintiff must show
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The "outed" plaintiff's second route of legal redress is an inva-
sion of privacy claim. Like defamation, invasion of privacy is a state
tort claim on which the Supreme Court has placed constitutional
limitations.19 A prima facie case 20 requires that the plaintiff demon-
strate that the defendant's publication was an offensive, public dis-
closure of private facts. 21 Additionally, and significantly in relation
to future "outing" cases, the Court has interpreted the United
States Constitution as requiring that the plaintiff also show the pub-
lication's lack of newsworthiness. 22 The Supreme Court has long
noted the democratic concern for a free press23 and has interpreted
the First Amendment as providing a constitutional privilege for the
media.24 That is, the Court accords more protection to the press
than to other modes of discourse. This privilege, however, extends
only to newsworthy publications. 25 Whether the media privilege
exists when the press publishes facts not presently in the public do-
main remains unclear,26 since the Court has only discussed this
newsworthiness requirement in terms of information that is already
public. 2 7
"Outing" cases dearly will rest on claims of defamation or inva-
the statement's "falsity or [a] reckless disregard for the truth" on the part of the
publication).
19 See infra text accompanying notes 217-20 (discussion of Cox Broadcasting Corp.
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975)).
20 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 856-63 (5th ed. 1984)
[hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS] ("the disclosure of the private facts must
be a public disclosure and not a private one; ... the facts disclosed to the public must be
private facts ... and the matter made public must be one which would be highly offen-
sive and objectionable to a reasonable person.").
21 The definition of public disclosure is at best vague. In Vogue v. W.T. Grant Co.,
327 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1974), the court held that publication to an audience of four did
not constitute a public disclosure. There is little doubt, however, that newspaper articles
are generally accepted as public disclosures. See Didis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d
806, 808 (2d Cir. 1940) (article in New Yorker was a public disclosure because it is a
"weekly magazine of wide circulation throughout the United States"); Diaz v. Oakland
Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (article in a local paper about a
college student being a transsexual was deemed a public disclosure).
22 Because of the need to balance competing interests, the Supreme Court has used
the term "public interest" without precisely defining newsworthiness. See infra notes 83-
85 and accompanying text. One court, however, has set forth a detailed test for deter-
mining newsworthiness which includes an assessment of: (1) the social value of the facts;
(2) the depth of the article's intrusion; and (3) the extent of the party's voluntary acces-
sion to public notoriety. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 875 (Cal.
1971) (quoting Kapellas v. Kofman, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)).
23 See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) ("whatever is
added to the field of libel is taken from the field of free debate") (quoting Sweeney v.
Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
24 See infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
25 See id.
26 For discussion about the open-endedness of the Court's view of public disclosure
of news not already public, see infra notes 216-40 and accompanying text.
27 See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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sion of privacy, but "outing" presents unique problems for the
traditional legal framework. The current legal structure assumes
that courts are capable of striking a balance between freedom of the
press and an individual's right to reputation and privacy. Sexual
orientation, however, does not fit into this balance, and the problem
lies in the essence of sexual orientation. The legal difficulty with
sexuality28 stems from the fact that sexuality is not synonymous with
sexual activity. 29 Sexuality, whether a genetic or cultural construct,
inheres in the person; it is an ontological concept.3 0 The distinction
is simply one between what a person does and what that person iS. 3 1
In terms of privacy and the individual, sexual activities are often
made public voluntarily, and therefore can be regulated or socially
controlled.3 2 Sexual orientation, however, need not have any public
component; it is not defined by one's activities.3 3 Consequently,
''outing" raises the question of how much of a person's "being" the
public can have access to, as well as the difficulty in determining
exactly what one's sexual orientation is. For courts and practition-
ers, the question will concern the extent to which the prima facie
requirements of defamation and invasion of privacy suits are dis-
rupted by the conceptual difficulties of speaking about sexual orien-
tation. In order to understand the legal position of "outing" in
defamation and invasion of privacy suits, however, it is first neces-
28 See infra note 32. For purposes of this Note, "sexuality" and "sexual orientation"
are synonymous. Although sexuality may evoke slightly different popular connotations,
the legal writings on the topic have used the terms interchangeably, and this Note stays
within that tradition.
29 For a general discussion of the legal difficulties with the concept of homosexual-
ity in particular, see Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Ho-
mosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 799 (1979).
30 For a discussion as to the genetic or familial production of sexuality, see the
findings of the Kinsey Institute study in ALLEN BELL ET AL., SEXUAL PREFERENCE: ITS
DEVELOPMENT IN MEN AND WOMEN (1981); see also David A.J. Richards, Sexual Autonomy
and the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 30 HASTINGS Li. 957 (1979); but see CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAWv 49-52 (1987) (argu-
ing that sexuality is a socio-political, not a biological, construct).
31 Courts confuse activities with orientation, although the two are not necessarily
the same. See infra note 32.
32 State solicitation cases exemplify how sexual activity, not sexuality, comes into
confrontation with the law, and how the public nature of that sexual activity subjects it to
some form of social control. See, e.g., Pryor v. Municipal Court, 599 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1979)
(man solicited undercover police officer to perform oral copulation in a parking lot);
Commonwealth v. Sefranka, 414 N.E.2d 602 (Mass. 1980) (man charged with solicitation
of homosexual acts at a rest area); People v. Uplinger 447 N.E.2d 62 (N.Y. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 246 (1984) (man charged with soliciting another man to engage in ho-
mosexual intercourse in a public place).
33 See DAVID F. GREENBERG, THE CONSTRUCTION OF HOMOSEXUALITY 1-4 (1988); AL-
FRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948); KENNETH LEWES, THE
PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY OF MALE HOMOSEXUALITY 232-41 (1988).
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sary to explore the historical development of these two causes of
action.
C. History of Defamation and Invasion of Privacy
1. Defamation Before New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan
Defamation is a common-law tort claim that provides an indi-
vidual redress for the invasion of one's interest in reputation or
good name.3 4 Prior to the Norman Conquest, early English canon
law defined defamation as an insult against a person's character, and
an apology was the only form of remedy.3 5 By the seventeenth cen-
tury, common-law courts were providing damages as redress for
false attacks on reputation.36 The present day claim of defamation
retains this common-law tradition and requires both falsity of state-
ment and damage to reputation.
In a common-law suit of defamation, the law presumed damage
to the plaintiff's reputation.3 7 The common law, however, has failed
to precisely define the notion of reputation.38 Dean Prosser stresses
that reputation is a "relational" concept3 9 since common-law suits
hinged solely upon whether or not the plaintiff's reputation was
lowered in the estimation of the community. 40 Interaction with the
public defines reputation, 4 1 and defamation focuses on how an ac-
34 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 771.
35 Colin R. Lovell, The Reception of Defamation by the Common Law, 15 VAND. L. REV.
1051, 1053 (1962) (Lovell points out that if the defendant resisted this remedy, the
plaintiff was to "be compensated with no lighter penalty than the cutting off of [the
defendant's] tongue") (footnote omitted).
36 See Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM.
L. REV. 546, 568-73 (1903); Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of
Defamation II, 4 COLUM. L. REV. 33, 39-41 (1904).
37 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966) (common-law defamation demon-
strates the "pervasive and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon rep-
utation"). See Thompson v. Upton, 146 A.2d 880 (Md. 1958) (an allegation that the
plaintiff was part of a "racket" was sufficient to lower his reputation and thereby consti-
tute defamation); Wandt v. Hearst's Chicago American, 109 N.W. 70 (Wis. 1906) (the
court found the allegation that the plaintiff had attempted suicide to damage
reputation).
38 Although common-law notions of reputation resided in the relational dealings
between people, it is unclear whether reputation consisted merely of public image or
whether something more tangible and inherently personal constituted reputation. It has
been argued that, in fact, courts have "not attempted to define reputation" but merely
assumed that everyone knew what reputation was. Note, Developments in the Law--Defa-
mation, 69 HARV. L. REV. 875, 877 (1956).
39 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 771.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 comment e; see Kimmerle v. New York
Evening Journal, 186 N.E. 217 (N.Y. 1933) (defamation "induce[s] an evil opinion of
one in the minds of right-thinking persons"). This notion of the damage to reputation
stems from Parmiter v. Coupland, 151 Eng. Rep. 340 (1840), quoted in PROSSER AND
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 773.
41 See RICHARD POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION, 58-74 (1990) (Reputa-
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tion causes others to view the plaintiff.42 Unlike many tort laws that
measure damages in absolute terms, independent of the social ef-
fects of the tortious actions, courts determine damages in defama-
tion suits only by assessing how the defendant's actions affected the
plaintiff's relationship to the whole of his or her society.43 Thus,
damages in defamation suits rest on "the law[s] recogni[tion] in
every man [of] a right to have the estimation in which he stands in
the opinion[s] of others" 44 determine the extent of injury.
In addition to injury to reputation, the claim of defamation is
also based on notions of falsity. 45 Under the common law, truth
constituted a defense to the plaintiff's charge of defamation, 46 and
the defendant was required to prove the statement's truth.47 Plac-
ing the burden of proof on the defendant deterred individuals from
merely repeating what they had heard and thus helped to prevent
the "mere repetition of slander." 48 Diane Zimmerman argues that
although truth had been a defense until the early seventeenth cen-
tury, at the time the First Amendment was drafted "truth was not a
defense in criminal defamation actions."'49 Instead, at the end of the
seventeenth century and throughout the eighteenth century, malice
tion is a "pro-attitude by other people toward the person 'whose' reputation is in is-
sue.") (citation omitted); RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 184-85
(1990) (reputation is not "an asset of the person," but is a transactional concept).
42 Robert Post has argued that this notion of reputation was, and still is, a divisible
notion of property, honor, and dignity. Dignity and honor are, by definition, conferred
upon a person through society's perception of that person, which does not necessarily
correspond to who that person is. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Defamation
Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 691, 696-708 (1986). Conse-
quently, all of Post's notions presume an underlying theory of ownership, not only of
the tangible property interest, but also of an image of that person.
43 One earns a reputation and, therefore, reputation is part of the marketplace-it
creates capital because it creates the "potential for 'patronage and support.' " Post,
supra note 42, at 693-94. Since reputation is akin to goodwill, one's "earnings" exist
only because of how society has viewed the person. This economic view underscores the
socially relational aspect of reputation.
44 Scott v. Sampson, 8 Q.B.D. 491, 503 (1882).
45 See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 804.
46 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 558, 613 (1938).
47 Owens v. Scott Publishing Co., 284 P.2d 296, 303 (Wash. 1955) ("[T]he defend-
ants [must] sustain the defense of truth [and] prove by a fair preponderance of the evi-
dence the substantial truth of each and every defamatory and libelous statement .... );
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 582 comment h (1938); id. § 613(2)(a). Under Ameri-
can constitutional law, the press, as defendant, need no longer prove the truth of the
publication.
48 Nicholson v. Rust, 52 S.W. 933, 934 (Ky. 1899) ("tale bearers are as bad as tale
makers) (citation omitted); see also Skinner v. Powers, 1 Wend. 451, 457 (N.Y. 1828)
("publication in a newspaper of rumors is not justified by the fact that sucl" rumors
existed").
49 Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's
Privaty Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 308 (1983).
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was the basis for recovery in defamation. 50 That is, courts did not
impose liability for false, benign speech but could impose liability
for truthful speech, if promulgated with a malicious intent. It is,
therefore, unlikely that the Framers intended to make all truthful
speech immune from liability.
By the nineteenth century, United States courts unequivocally
viewed truth as a complete defense to defamation suits 5' and sought
to prevent the placement of limitations on truthful speech.5 2 In
part, this view of defamation law evolved from the post-Revolution-
ary, democratic desire for the free dissemination of information and
the ability to criticize governmental figures.53 The desire to foster
economic development and the free exchange of ideas further pro-
moted a "no limitations" policy on truthful speech. 54 The legal fo-
cus of defamation, therefore, shifted from a concern over reputation
toward the social value in fostering truthful speech.55
2. Sullivan and Its Legacy
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,56 the Supreme Court subjected
the law of defamation, traditionally a state law question, to First
Amendment analysis.57 In 1960, L.B. Sullivan was the police com-
missioner in Montgomery, Alabama. 58 When an advertisement
placed in the New York Times by Martin Luther King's civil rights
movement charged the Montgomery police with brutality, Sullivan
brought a defamation action against the New York Times Coin-
50 See Crawford v. Middleton, 83 Eng. Rep. 308 (1674) (the defendant was not lia-
ble because he had spoken the words "as a story, and not with any malice"), quoted in
LAURENCE H. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 25-29 (1978).
51 Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 311. See, e.g., Neilson v.Jensen, 76 N.W. 866 (Neb.
1898); Atwater v. Morning News Co., 34 A. 865 (Conn. 1896); Dement v. Houston Print-
ing, Co., 37 S.W. 985 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896); Langton v. Hagerty, 35 Wis. 150 (1874) (all
of these cases held that truth is a defense to defamation).
52 See Fort Worth Press Co. v. Davis, 96 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936)
(libel should not stand when "statements set forth ... are substantially true").
53 For a discussion of this heritage, see KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 87-106 (1989); see also infra note 63 and accompanying text.
54 See infra note 68 (discussion of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988)).
55 This led publishers of defamatory material to print it at the risk of not being able
to prove its veracity if they were ultimately sued. The damage to reputation alone was
not sufficient to prove defamation. For further discussion of the legal changes in defa-
mation, see Joan E. Schaffner, Note, Protection of Reputation Versus Freedom of Expression:
Striking a Manageable Compromise in the Tort of Defamation, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 433, 435-42
(1990).
56 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
57 Sullivan set forth the basic requirements for recovery: knowledge of falsity or
disregard for truth when the subject is a public figure. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. In
the case of private plaintiffs, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), set a
minimum standard for recovery but left it to the states to impose further standards.
58 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
[Vol. 77:103110
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pany.5 9 The defendants failed to prove the truth of their claims, and
the jury found for the plaintiff.60 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that in the case of public officials, the public official bringing
the action must prove that the "statement was made with 'actual
malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not." 6' Similarly, at least when
the matter is of public concern, the First Amendment requires a
plaintiff to prove the falsity of the statement.62 Since criticism of the
government is central to the democratic exchange of ideas, the fear
of uttering potential falsehoods could chill free expression by the
press. 63 The Court held that the press need not 5'guarantee the
truth of all [its] factual assertions." 64 Thus, the Sullivan Court set
the standard that in the case of public officials or matters of public
concern, an individual's right to recover for defamation must be bal-
anced against the constitutional issue of freedom of the press.65
While New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan established clear standards
for courts to follow in defamation suits, the opinion also articulated
the Court's methodology for adjudicating the rights of the individ-
ual against the rights of the press.66 First, the decision clearly estab-
lished falsehood as a threshold requirement for recovery.67
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. This holding represents a move away from the com-
mon-law notion that the defendant must prove the truth of the statement. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment b (1977) (the statement in issue is presumed
false, and the defendant had to raise truth as an affirmative defense); PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON TORTS, supra note 20. But see Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of
Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1964). The burden, as
Sullivan states, has shifted to the plaintiff, thus demonstrating the priority of the First
Amendment.
62 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (limiting First Amendment protection to defamatory speech
involving public matters).
63 "The rule [of requiring the defendant to prove truth] dampens the vigor and
limits the variety of public debate." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
64 Id. The Court further expressed the policy underlying its holding by stating that
"would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism." Id.
For an argument that Sullivan "permits no libel actions against the critics of official con-
duct," see Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered- Time to Return to the
Central Meaning of the First Amendment, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603, 621 (1983).
65 As Laurence Tribe points out, implicit in this ruling is the notion that potentially
"the first amendment establishes a right to speak defamatory truth." LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 864 (2d ed. 1988).
66 Sullivan was the first case in which the Court spoke of the first amendment limita-
tions on common-law defamation actions. See Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language
and Law: New York Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. REV. 273, 277-80 (1990).
67 Sullivan set forth the "actual malice" standard that the plaintiff must prove the
falsity of a statement and that it was spoken with "reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The epistemological approach behind this
standard is obviously based on the dichotomy of falsity and truth. Thus, even if plaintiffs
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Underlying this standard is the need to promote the free exchange
of ideas as well as to recognize that such an exchange is only worth-
while when dealing with truth.68 However, the Court's definition of
the malice requirement, 69 which prevents some plaintiffs from re-
covering despite publications of falsehoods, undermines its commit-
ment to true speech. As the Court said, to require factual support
for every comment would be comparable to "self-censorship." 70
Even though the malice standard may complicate some plaintiffs'
cases, the Court's underlying methodological approach involves bal-
ancing the rights of the press with rights of individuals, by dichoto-
mizing its analysis between truth and falsity. 71
The Sullivan Court's second requirement for a successful
defamation suit involved the separation of public and private
figures. Like the truth/falsity division, this standard shows the
Court's penchant for a dichotomized epistemology. 72 Sullivan,
stands for the right to criticize public officials and was ultimately
expanded to protect debate over public issues. 73 According to the
Court, the democratic process exemplifies the "national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be unin-
are not proving falsity, they are proving a disregard for truth-either way, the premise is
that the stajtment is always either true or false.
68 In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988), the Court stated
that "[f]alse statements of fact are particularly valueless; they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas." In Sullivan, the Court stressed that the
policy behind its decision was to promote criticism of public actions of public officials
because in a democracy "the advantages derived are so great, that they more than coun-
terbalance the inconvenience of private persons." Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 281. If, however,
the speech is knowingly false then no such good can be derived from it. It does not
promote the free exchange of ideas or inform the public. Consequently, the policy to
promote speech is actually a desire to promote true speech.
69 See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 (" 'actual malice' requires knowledge that [the
statement] was false or ... reckless disregard of whether it was false or not"); see also St.
Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968) ("Publishing with such doubts [as to the
truth of the publication] shows reckless disregard for truth or falsity and demonstrates
actual malice.").
70 "A rule compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his
factual assertions... leads to a comparable 'self-censorship.' " Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
71 The Court has identified areas outside the defamation context in which the right
to a free press does not guarantee that one may publish any truthful statement. See
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563 (1976) (papers enjoined from printing
certain items about a case because they could "impair the defendant's right to a fair
trial"); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 703 (1931) (recognizing that a newspaper
which publishes "malicious, scandalous, and defamatory articles," that are also blatantly
anti-Semitic, while perhaps not suppressible under the Constitution, may be punished
consistently with the Constitution).
72 See Halpern, supra note 66, at 282-89 (analyzing the Court's use of the dichoto-
mies of public/private figures and public/private issues from Curtis Publishing through
Dun & Bradstreet).
73 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971). As the Court has
stated, the ability to criticize public figures is "more than self-expression; it is the es-
sence of self-government." Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
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hibited, robust, and wide-open." 74 Of course, one can only extend
this principle of democracy to information about private individuals,
if the nature of information is of a public concern. 75
The Supreme Court further defined Sullivan's difficult standard
regarding First Amendment protection in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts
and Associated Press v. Walker,76 two cases decided together. Curtis
dealt with a football coach charged with fixing games. 77 Walker con-
cerned a retired general's voluntary choice to help desegregate the
University of Mississippi. 78 In both cases, the Court held that the
men were "public figures."7 The Court distinguished between pri-
vate and public individuals by asserting that if people are involved in
"important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape
events in areas of concern to society at large,"80 then the press can
invoke First Amendment protection when it writes about these pub-
lic figures. 8' With these decisions, the extension of the press's free-
dom moved from a discussion of public officials to a debate over
public issues that surround public figures.82
Using its dichotomized methodology first promulgated in Sulli-
van, the Court then explored when an issue becomes a matter of
"public concern." In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.83 the police ar-
rested the plaintiff for selling allegedly obscene literature. 84 Me-
tromedia broadcast the news story and referred to the plaintiff as
74 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
75 Whether the concepts of public issues and public persons are different is de-
bated. The standard from Sullivan was based on the status of the person or on the cor-
relative fact that the person was involved in public matters. Later, in Rosenbloom v.
Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971), Justice Brennan noted that "[t]he public's
primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant and
the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity
or notoriety."
76 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Both cases were decided with a single opinion.
77 Id. at 135.
78 Id. at 140. For a thorough analysis of these cases, see Henry Kalven, The Reason-
able Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CT. RE'. 267.
79 Curtis, 388 U.S. at 139 (the public figure status was conferred because both men
were "involved in activities of great interest to the public").
80 Id. at 163-64.
81 "The dissemination of the individual's opinions on matters of public interest is
for us . . . an 'unalienable right' that 'governments are instituted among men to se-
cure.' " Id. at 149 (citation omitted). The rationales given reflected those which the
Court mentioned in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). See infra notes 90-
95.
82 There is some doubt as to the fine distinctions between these two categories.
Later, the Court discussed the difficult parameters of these terms. See Dun & Bradstreet
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc.. 472 U.S. 749, 765-72 (1985) (the Court questioned
whether the idea of "public concern" obscures or makes unnecessary the notion of the
public official) (Whtne, J.. concurring); see also Halpern, supra note 66.
83 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
84 Id. at 32.
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involved in the "smut literature racket."' 5 The Court determined
that the issue was of "general or public interest,"86 and that the
First Amendment outweighed any concern for reputation,8 7 but
never explicitly defined an issue of "public interest." As a result,
individual courts now have the power to decide on an ad hoc basis
what constitutes an item of public interest.88 Depending upon how
courts define "public interest," any information regarding a person
is potentially open to the press. How much of the self the individual
retains under this methodological approach, and whether sexuality
should be considered a matter of" 'general or public interest' re-
mains" uncertain.8 9
The Supreme Court's ruling that the press is protected from
suits for publication of personal information requires not only a de-
termination of whether the targeted figure is public or private, but
also a calculation of the scope of an individual's "publicness" and
whether the published material falls within that scope. The
Supreme Court addressed this question in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. ,90 in which the plaintiff sued the press for publishing allegations
of his Communist involvement. The Court analyzed both the plain-
tiff's status as a public or private figure and whether the subject mat-
ter concerned public or private issues.91 Reversing the Rosenbloom
Court's extension of constitutional requirements to private figures,
the Court held that when a case involves a public figure, the plaintiff
must prove malice in addition to falsity because the involvement of
public events gives rise to a strong First Amendment concern.92
The Court stated that public figures are those who have "assumed
roles of special prominence[,] ... occupy positions of... power and
influence... [or] have thrust themselves to the forefront of particu-
lar public controversies." 93 One rationale for adopting such a defi-
85 Id. at 34.
86 Id. at 44 ("libel law ... derives from the question whether the allegedly defama-
tory publication concerns a matter of public or general interest").
87 The Court reasoned that "protecting individual reputation often yields to other
important social goals. In this case, the vital needs of freedom of the press and freedom
of speech persuade us that allowing private citizens to obtain damage judgments ...
would not provide adequate 'breathing space' for these great freedoms." Id. at 49-50.
88 The Court best expressed this concern in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974), when discussing the Rosenbloom ruling, but the Court again failed to
establish a definition. The Court stated that "[the Rosenbloom court's reasoning] would
occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad
hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest.'.
89 See id
90 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
91 The Court noted that the "New York Times standard defines the level of constitu-
tional protection ... of a public person," Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, and establishes the
"public or general interest test" concerning the issues in question. Id. at 346.
92 Id. at 342.
93 Id. at 345.
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nition is that these people have access to the media and can contest
any accusation. 94 Another rationale is based on society's right to
know about public figures; 95 this concern again implicates the First
Amendment's purpose of promoting political debate. The problem
with the Court's sharp distinctions, however, is that the definition
and the parameters of the categories are vague.
Sullivan and its progeny leave us with a distinction, albeit vague,
between the public and private realms of both the individual and the
information disseminated. 96 When the case involves a public per-
son and a public issue, Sullivan and Gertz dictate that the plaintiff
must demonstrate the falsity of the statement and a reckless disre-
gard for its truth. When the case concerns a private person and a
public issue, Gertz, as interpreted by the court in Dun & Bradstreet,
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,97 requires that the plaintiff need only
show a negligent disregard for the statement's truth. The Court has
yet to determine the appropriate standard for a case concerning a
public figure and a private fact. The Court has only cryptically as-
serted that the Sullivan standard "does not mean that any speech
about a public figure is immune from sanction."98 In each of these
standards, however, the Court's use of dichotomized categories has
marked its method of interpretation.
3. Invasion of Privacy
Though essentially a state tort claim, intrusion into an individ-
ual's private life, like defamation, is circumscribed by constitutional
principles. Generally, a prima facie case for an invasion of privacy
claim requires a public disclosure of private information that results
in a highly offensive intrusion.99 However, the elements of a privacy
tort are difficult to describe because they vary between jurisdic-
94 "Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to
the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements." Id. at 344.
95 "Those who attain this status [of public figure] have assumed roles of especial
prominence in the affairs of society ... they invite attention and comment." Id. at 345.
96 In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985),
the Court was candid about the ambiguity of these terms when it defined a matter of
"public concern" as depending upon "the content, form, and context" of the expres-
sion. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court suggested that the
public figure determination was always linked to the public nature of the issue in ques-
tion. This raises questions about the status of private information regarding a public
person, and whether that private information must be considered part of the "public-
ness" of the person.
97 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985).
98 Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988).
99 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). The Restatement defines
private information as that which a reasonable person would find highly personal and
which would offend ordinary sensibilities if disclosed.
1991]
116 CORNELL L4 W REVIEW [Vol. 77:103
tions.' 0 0 In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,10 the Court reaffirmed
the precept that in order for a plaintiff to recover, the Constitution
requires the absence of a legitimate public interest in the disclosed
facts. 10 2 While this case may suggest that the Court subordinates
the privacy interest to the freedom of the press,10 3 "outing" chal-
lenges the methodology that gives rise to this result and redefines a
sphere of privacy that the press cannot appropriate.
4. History of Privacy
Privacy, unlike defamation, originated to protect a person's
right to be let alone 10 4 and has repeatedly conflicted with the consti-
tutional value of freedom of the press. Yet privacy's history, like its
present status, is perhaps more questionable than that of defama-
tion. The Bill of Rights does not expressly mention a general pri-
vacy interest. 0 5 In addition, the common law was not felicitous of
100 As to what constitutes a "highly offensive" intrusion, some courts use the stan-
dard of a reasonable person with "ordinary sensibilities." Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace,
Jovanovich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (The question is whether
"a reasonable person [would find] the article highly offensive"); Melvin v. Reid, 297 P.
91 (Cal. 1931) (concerning a prostitute's past and suggesting a "mores" test to deter-
mine the "offensiveness" of the intrusion). For a general list of how various jurisdic-
tions differ as to the required components of the privacy tort, see PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 856-62. For commentary that describes the tort as hope-
lessly vague, see Harry Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31
LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 326 (1966).
101 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
102 The First Amendment will allow for the dissemination of private information if it
concerns "events of legitimate concern to the public and consequently fall[s] within the
responsibility of the press to report." Id. at 492. This has been labeled the "newswor-
thiness" exception to an individual's privacy.
1O3 See also Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (Court may have effectively
prevented a plaintiff from recovering against the press for truthful speech); infra notes
229-35 and accompanying text. For a general commentary on this trend, see DON R.
PEMBER, PRIVACY AND THE PRESS: THE LAW, THE MASS MEDIA, AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 238 (1972); Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost of Justice
Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1197-99 (1990).
104 PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 20, at 864. Although defamation and
privacy claims protect different concerns, a defamation claim becomes similar to a pri-
vacy claim when it involves the issue of "private or public interest." Even Brandeis and
Warren used the language of defamation when they wrote that "privacy does not pro-
hibit any publication of matter which is of public or general interest." Samuel D. War-
ren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214 (1890). In
general, plaintiffs have relied on an invasion of privacy claim when the information dis-
seminated was true but private. "Outing" allows for such reliance as well.
105 Obviously the origins of a privacy interest is hotly debated. See ROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 97-99 (1990) (the Bill of Rights does not mention a general
right to privacy). But see TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1390 ("the fourth amendment more
than any other explicit constitutional provision reflects the existence of [some right to
privacy]"). The debate exists because there is no express mention of privacy in the Con-
stitution. Even Tribe in arguing for the right, finds it "reflectfedl" in the Fourth
Amendment, though not stated explicitly. Id.
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extending protection to individuals harmed by truthful but private
disclosures of information.10 6 Whatever its tacit presence, until
1890 no one had set forth a fully detailed privacy interest.
In an attempt to delineate the respective spheres of individual
privacy interests and the constitutional values concerning freedom
of the press, Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren published The Right
to Privacy.10 7 Arguing for protection from the press, the authors put
forth the right "to be let alone,"108 and asserted that individuals
should be able to prevent the press's invasion of their privacy.' 0 9
Brandeis and Warren argued that an "unwarranted violation of the
'honor' "110 of individuals occurs when those individuals fail to con-
trol personal information about themselves. While recognizing that
the First Amendment principle of disseminating information de-
served much deference, Brandeis and Warren maintained that a line
could be drawn when the information concerned the "private life,
habits, acts, and relations of an individual.""' Although these pro-
tected categories are ambiguous, Brandeis and Warren saw a need
for individuals to protect that which they "owned" of the self. The
line they drew was their attempt to demarcate ownership between
the public and private realms.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill" 2 the Supreme Court addressed this ten-
sion between the public and private realms. The Court recognized
possible privacy tort liability for the publication of falsehoods, and
thereby articulated the tension between the press's freedom and the
individual's right to privacy. 11 This case, which produced great
publicity, involved a family that had been held captive in their
106 See Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899); Robetson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902); ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND
FREEDOM 348 (1968) (mentioning the "gossip press, commercial advertising, and expo-
sure of the doings of the socially prominent" both as tolerated practices and as the
impetus behind the Warren and Brandeis article).
107 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 104.
108 Id. at 195.
109 "For years there has been a feeling that the law must afford some remedy for the
unauthorized circulation of portraits of private persons; [sic] and the evil"of the invasion
of privacy by the newspapers, long keenly felt, has been but recently discussed by an
able writer." Id. The authors, while obviously responding to the "yellow journalism" of
the day, did not, however, specifically define the kinds of information that the law should
protect. See Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 295.
110 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 104, at 198. This stems from Brandeis and War-
ren's view that privacy was merely "part of the more general right to the immunity of the
person." Id. at 207.
111 Id. at 216. This has led some commentators to suggest that the standard de-
pends upon the individual tastes and preferences of the plaintiff.' See James H. Barron,
Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 875, 904 (1979); Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 295.
112 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
113 Time, 385 U.S. at 383 n.7.
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home.1 4 Shortly after the incident, the Hill family brought an inva-
sion of privacy suit againstJoseph Hayes, who wrote a play based on
the crime, and against Life Magazine, which ran an article with pic-
tures detailing the true incident. 1 5  The Court noted that
"[r]evelations may be so intimate and... unwarranted in view of the
victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of de-
cency."116 The Court found that the New York state privacy statute
did not invade the constitutional protections of the press, and on
remand the court of appeals sustained the jury verdict for the Hill
family. Justice Brennan reasoned that the newsworthiness of a pub-
lication must be balanced against the sense of violation to the pri-
vate individual.' 17 The Court's methodological approach was based
on the public/private dichotomy and therefore was closely akin to
the method used in defamation suits. 1 18 This dichotomized view of
private and public engenders the inevitable tension between the in-
dividual's right to privacy and the public's right to news. 119 The
tension stems from the Court's need to place every situation into an
"either/or" structure. 120 As this Note will later develop, such an
approach may not be feasible when the topic involves sexual
orientation.
5. Privacy's Present Status
Courts must always adjudicate the right to be "let alone" in
light of the constitutional freedom of the press.' 21 Accordingly, the
present status of privacy reflects the difficulty of distinguishing be-
114 Id. at 377.
115 The title of the article was "True Crime Inspires Tense Play." Id. at 377. The
play only paralleled the actual crime. The question of falsity and truth, however, did not
occupy a significant role in the Court's reasoning.
116 Id. at 383 n.7 (quoting Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940)).
117 Id.
118 The Court stated that there was a "vast difference in the state interest in protect-
ing individuals like Mr. Hill from irresponsibly prepared publicity and the state interest
in similar protection for a public official." Id at 408. The Court differentiated privacy
from defamation claims by stating that privacy damage is the "mental distress from hav-
ing been exposed to public view." Id. at 384-85 n.9. However, the Court used the Sulli-
van standard that the defendant reported the information with a "knowledge of falsity or
... reckless disregard of the truth." Id at 387-88. Although privacy claims and defama-
tion claims are not the same, the epistemological approach of the Court in these areas is
the same; the Court views the legal issues as matters of binary logic (private/public).
119 See Comment, Privacy, Defamation, and the First Amendment. The Implications of Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 926 (1967).
120 This is best exemplified by the Court's discussion of whether the Hill family,
because of the initial reports of the crime, had already become public figures and there-
fore were subject to less First Amendment protection. The status of the family was ques-
tionable, but the Court still felt a need to categorize them for the sake of the mechanical
privacy "test."
121 See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
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tween private and public spheres. The Supreme Court first devel-
oped the scope of the constitutional right to privacy in the cases of
Griswold v. Connecticut 122 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.'23 In Griswold, the
Court declared a Connecticut statute, forbidding the use of contra-
ceptives, unconstitutional and affirmed the right of married couples
to a zone of privacy "protected from government intrusion."'124
Griswold only extended this privacy right to married couples, while in
Eisenstadt the Court stressed that the right to privacy "is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."' 125 Although
the Court in Eisenstadt continued to limit the scope of the privacy
right, this case demonstrates the Court's strong inclination to carve
out certain spheres of privacy. "Privacy" in these situations relates
to an individual's control over personal identity or autonomy. 26
With regard to certain legal issues, however, this inclination
may be changing.' 27 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services128 ad-
dressed the constitutionality of a Missouri statute that prohibited
abortions in public facilities and required a doctor to perform a via-
bility test before allowing the abortion. 29 Webster showed that the
present Court has a desire to enlarge state control of abortion.
However, whether the Court will go so far as to allow states to com-
pletely ban abortion is impossible to predict. As state control in-
creases, one's right to autonomy may be reduced. Thus, it will be
difficult to determine what this newly defined sphere of privacy may
include. The Court will not necessarily contract the whole range of
privacy rights simply because these rights may have been limited in
the context of abortion. The Webster decision only limits the range
of personal autonomy announced in Roe v. Wade.' 30 Nevertheless,
122 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
123 405 U.S. 438 (1972). At issue in Griswold was a Connecticut law that forbade the
use of, or the aiding in the use of, contraceptives. Eisenstadt dealt with the legislature's
right to limit distribution of contraceptives to married people. Admittedly, neither of
these cases involved the press, but each demonstrates the Court's recent methodological
approach toward the balance between privacy and public concerns.
124 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483.
125 Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
126 See MACKINNON, supra note 30, at 93-102 (the fight for control over one's person
is the female fight against male hegemony, and a woman's quest for privacy rights is
emblematic of the quest for selfhood); Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 233, 236 (1977).
127 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), has had an enormous effect on rede-
fining notions of privacy. This Note discusses Bowers separately in relation to sexual
orientation and privacy. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
128 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
129 Id. at 513.
130 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Webster, the Court held that the viability test require-
ment was constitutional. Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20 (viability determination is constitu-
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the reasoning of the Webster decision as well as the recent shift in the
Court's composition' 3' may suggest that a redefinition of the right
to privacy or autonomy is forthcoming.
How the Court will balance an individual's privacy right against
the freedom of the press remains unclear. Although Eisenstadt and
Griswold limited governmental intrusion into individuals' lives, they
established the methodological approach that the Court presently
takes toward other issues of privacy. 132 The Court has determined
that governmental intrusion into some spheres of privacy that indi-
viduals control is difficult to justify.13 3 In a fundamental way, the
Court views any legal interest as either private or public. Although
a newspaper's printing of personal information about an individual
does not constitute governmental intrusion, the Court has stated
that all privacy issues evoke the "same constitutional purpose-to
maintain inviolate large areas of personal privacy."' 34 The Court
has found that privacy is a basic constitutional right which remains
unaffected whether the defendants in the case are the press or gov-
ernmental officials.'8 5 The Court's approach to privacy issues is to
question, as it did in Griswold, where privacy ends and the public
interest, be it governmental or the rights of the press, begins. For
the Court, these are sharply dichotomized legal areas.
tional, since it permissibly "furthers the State's interest in protecting potential human
life"). A plurality further suggested that the trimester approach of Roe should be over-
turned because this test gave a greater role to the state in regulating abortions. Id. at
533-35.
131 In terms ofjudicial balance the Rehnquist Court bears little resemblance to the
Burger Court of the Roe v. Wade years. For a general discussion of how the composition
affects decisions, see ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION (1987).
132 Although it never explicitly articulated its methodology, the Griswold Court spe-
cifically differentiated the zones of privacy "where privacy is protected from governmen-
tal intrusion." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483. Thus, the Court must somehow determine the
definition of the private sphere as distinct from the public. In Webster, the Court was not
called upon to rethink its methodology, and it continued to employ notions of the public
and private spheres. The case merely calls into question where the division between
those spheres actually exists.
133 Eisenstadt supports the right of privacy over "the decision whether to bear or
beget a child." Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. Similarly, Griswold's holding may be seen as
either narrowly defining privacy to include only the decision to procreate, or enlarging
the "zone of privacy" and potentially opening several avenues of privacy interests.
134 Time, Inc. v. Hill. 385 U.S. 374, 414 (1967).
135 Id. at 414-15. The Court states that privacy is a right "emanating 'from the total-
ity of the constitutional scheme' "and that this right applies to "inva[sion] by words-by
the press." Id. at 415. One could also read the limitations on the press-that freedom of
the press does not allow for unlimited access to peoples' lives-as an implicit constitu-
tional guarantee by the Court that the privacy right protects against not only govern-




"OUTING" REQUIRES A RETHINKING OF THE LEGAL
REQUIREMENTS OF DEFAMATION AND INVASION
OF PRIVACY
A. "Outing" and Its Effects on the Law of Defamation
The topic of sexual orientation has created a unique presence
in the law13 6 which in many ways disrupts conventional notions of
privacy and defamation. "Outing" will challenge the Supreme
Court's standard methodological approach to defamation suits and
concomitantly could force the Court to reassess its balancing of pri-
vate and public concerns. Sexual orientation complicates the
Court's need to separate truth from falsity in defamation suits.1 3 7
Because this dichotomy is a factor in balancing the rights of the
press against those of the individual, "outing" will further unsettle
the Court's mechanical method 138 of balancing these interests. Sex-
ual orientation also disrupts the public figure/private figure and
public issue/private issue dichotomies. Defamation law, in the con-
stitutional context, underscores the tension between the individual's
protection of reputation and the public's right to know certain infor-
mation.13 9 "Outing" of public figures raises the constitutional issue
of the public/private dichotomy and renews the debate over where
public concerns end and private autonomy begins.
1. "Outing's" Challenge to the Truth/Falsity Distinction
One of the requirements the Sullivan Court set forth for a suc-
cessful defamation suit was that the statement be knowingly false;' 40
sexual orientation challenges this requirement. The Court begins
its analysis of defamation by first determining the veracity of the
speech based on which of two simple categories it falls into: truth or
136 See, e.g., CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
126-155 (1989); RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYs/JusTICE: A STUDY OF ETHIcs, SOCIETY, AND
LAw (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relation-
ship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161 (1988); Lawrence A.
Wilson & Raphael Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of Association, 30 HAS-
TINGS Lj. 1029 (1979).
137 For discussion on the Court's use of this mechanical dichotomy, see supra notes
66-72 and accompanying text.
138 See supra text accompanying notes 66-120.
139 For more discussion of the Court's constitutional balancing of the public and
private concerns, see supra notes 72-98 and accompanying text.
140 The Court also made recovery available to a plaintiff who was capable of showing
the defendant's "reckless disregard of whether it was false or not" if actual knowledge of
falsity was not provable. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court in Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), further demonstrated the dichotomy at work even under the
recklessness standard when it defined reckless disregard as a "high degree of awareness
of... probable falsity." Thus, underlying either of these requirements is a finding that
the speech is demonstrably either true or false.
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falsity. However, such a simple categorical approach is ill-suited to
issues involving sexual orientation. 14 1 The first difficulty courts will
face is how to determine whether an individual is "gay." This prob-
lem has perplexed sociologists and psychologists for years, 142 and it
is doubtful that the courts can construct a definition that will com-
port with its rigid categories. A simple definition based on sexual
activities is problematic because there is no definitive number of
sexual acts that logically classifies someone as gay. 143 One homo-
sexual act need not necessarily mean someone is gay. If a man
sleeps with women five nights of the week and with men the other
two, it is debatable whether or not he is gay. Alternatively, the defi-
nition of "gay" could depend upon the particular sexual acts in
which one engages, but this definition is as problematic as the first.
In addition, fitting the person who only dreams of committing a ho-
mosexual act into any category is always problematic. Although the
definition of "gay" is uncertain, many courts have failed to take ac-
count of these difficulties.144 In Dew v. Halaby,' 45 for example, the
court labelled a husband and father a "homosexual" because he had
engaged in same-sex acts as an adolescent.' 46 In Bennett v. Clem-
ens,147 the court described a woman as living "the gay life" merely
because she associated with bisexuals, even though she never admit-
ted to having had any lesbian interaction.' 48 In Kerma Restaurant
141 Since the Court expressed the constitutional limitations on press freedom in Sul-
livan, no cases have been brought against newspapers for discussing a person's sexuality
that could test the Court's methodology. Cases concerning sexual crimes where the
information was already made public by police records have raised suits against the
press, but these have claimed invasion of privacy, not defamation. See supra note 32.
Defamation suits would subject the plaintiff to the added exposure about an issue that
carries social stigma. Consequently, cases such as these would logically tend to be set-
tled out of court.
142 See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 473-74
(1953) and KINSEY et al., supra note 33, at 638-41 (extensive studies demonstrating that
sexuality must be thought of as a continuum, and at the middle, where most people lie,
are those who are erotically aroused by both heterosexual and homosexual experiences);
DJ. WEST, HOMOSEXUALrrY RE-EXAMINED 1 (1977) ("The attempt to categorize all hu-
manity into two mutually exclusive and contrasting groups of homosexuals and heter-
osexuals . . . produces misleading over-simplifications.").
143 The difficulty in defining "gay" has been pursued extensively in a legal frame-
work by Rhonda Rivera, although she does not discuss "outing" or methodological
problems facing the courts. See Rivera, supra note 29, at 800-01.
144 For a fuller discussion of how courts have defined a person's sexuality and have
ignored distinctions, see Rivera, supra note 29, at 801-02 (noting the ambiguities in de-
fining "gay" and citing cases, though not discussed, which this Note also finds provoca-
tive. See infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text.).
145 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Court upheld the discharge of a CIA em-
ployee because the job involved secret security clearances and homosexual orientation
according to the Court, constituted a security threat. Id. at 587.
146 Id. at 583.
147 196 S.E.2d 842 (Ga. 1973).
148 Id. at 843.
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Corp. v. State Liquor Authority,' 49 the court labelled one man a homo-
sexual simply because he had the "stereotypical" features of a gay
person. These cases demonstrate the misleading oversimplification
inherent in categorizing people's sexuality. Determining whether
that categorization is true may be even more problematic. 150
Determining whether labels of sexuality are true or false invari-
ably leads to the further problem of verifying such claims. Sexual
orientation complicates this issue as well. As addressed in Philadel-
phia Newspapers v. Hepps,15 1 verification is, in part, a burden of proof
problem. In Hepps, the Philadelphia Inquirer published a series of arti-
cles alleging that Maurice Hepps, the principal stockholder of a cor-
poration owning convenience stores, was using his link to organized
crime to illegally influence the state government.' 52 Contrary to the
common law, the Court held that the plaintiff had the burden of
proving that the statements were false.' 53 Given this requirement,
"outed" plaintiffs might very well have to testify that they are not
homosexuals. 154 Plaintiffs could introduce testimony that they had
engaged in heterosexual activities, but with a concept as nebulous as
sexuality, determining whether plaintiffs are truly "gay" could be
impossible or at best dubious. Proof of nonhomosexual activity
alone might not satisfy the falsity requirement and might fail to sup-
port a plaintiff's defamation claim.' 55 How the trier of fact decides
149 278 N.Y.S.2d 951 (N.Y. App. Div. 1967), rev'd, 233 N.E.2d 833, (N.Y. 1967). A
restaurant's liquor license was suspended because of possible disorderly conduct when a
police officer found "patrons exhibiting characteristics and mannerisms which evi-
denced homosexual propensities." Id. at 952. The court upheld the revocation due to
the evidence that the "male patrons address[ed] each other in endearing terms." Id.
The decision was reversed because no disorderly conduct was proven; the discussion of
homosexuality based on stereotypical features was not disputed. Kerma, 233 N.E.2d at
835.
150 For a general discussion of how the definition of "homosexual" has been the
basis of legal problems, see Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sxual Minorities: A
Crisis of the Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGs LJ. 1131-39 (1979) (claiming that the
legal difficulties of homosexuals, or any sexual minority, directly result from the dichoto-
mized thinking that leads to the binary definitions of male and female and forces people
to choose a category); Rivera, supra note 29, at 800-04.
151 475 U.S. 767 (1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 60-65 (discussion of
burden of proof).
152 Hepps, 475 U.S. at 769.
153 Id. at 768-69 ("where a newspaper publishes speech of public concern, a private-
figure plaintiff cannot recover damages without also showing that the statements at issue
are false.) "[T]he common law's rule on falsity... must similarly fall here to a constitu-
tional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity ....". Id. at 776.
154 The Hepps Court did not specify a quantum of proof. Instead, states are left to
decide that standard. Some courts say that a preponderance of the evidence is required.
See Gazette, Inc. v. Harris, 325 S.E.2d 713, 725 (Va. 1985). Other courts demand clear
and convincing evidence. See Whitmore v. Kansas City Star Co., 499 S.W.2d 45, 49 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1973).
155 See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulty in
assessing one's sexuality merely on the basis of sexual activities. The Kinseyan notion of
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this issue ultimately depends on the court's definition of "gay."
Furthermore, the basis for these evidentiary standards rests on a no-
tion of "gay" that may be too elusive to reduce to a specific list of
features.156
"Outing" intensifies the definitional questions of defamation
because the press discusses sexual orientation and not sexual activi-
ties. 157 If the press were to report that "X was seen performing a
homosexual act" instead of announcing that "X is a homosexual,"
proving the truth of the statement would not be difficult. The for-
mer statement, therefore, would not create any methodological diffi-
culties for defamation. "Outing," however, concerns only the latter
type of statement, because the implications of the two differ. The
gay political agenda of "outing" is to promote positive public role
models and to expose the prominence of gay people.15 8 Because
homosexual acts do not necessarily mean that a person is gay, 159
"outing" does not merely address stories of sexual activities. 160
Consequently, although some news stories will not defy the categor-
ical approach of the Court, "outing" in its most prevalent form
questions the Court's approach because it concerns an orientation,
not an activity.
2. Defamation or Mere Opinion?
Newspapers often contain opinion pieces. Thus, one must ask
whether "outing" should require the Court to rethink its truth/fal-
sity methodology or whether an "outing" is merely opinion and
therefore does not elicit the same legal approach. In Old Dominion
Branch No. 496, National Assoc. of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 161 the Court
circumvented the debate between the First Amendment and individ-
ual rights. Although Austin involved a labor newsletter, the Court
a sexual continuum suggests that evidence of sexual activities may have little relevance.
See supra note 142.
156 Where the defendant clearly establishes the plaintiff's homosexuality, and the
plaintiff is unable to prove falsity, the "outed" plaintiff has no defamation claim. Conse-
quently, his or her suit must then be brought exclusively under invasion of privacy. See
supra text accompanying notes 19-27.
157 For the difference between these, see supra notes 15-27 and accompanying text.
For an example of how "outing" discusses sexual orientation, not sexual activity, see
supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
158 See Charlotte Low Allen, The World is 'Outing: The New Gay Militants, WASH.
TIMES, Sept. 13, 1990, at El; Bernard Levin, Come Out of that Closet, or We Go In and Fetch
You, THE TIMES, June 4, 1990.
159 See supra text accompanying note 143.
160 Because Outweek, Outline, and other gay newspapers are merely listing names of
suspected homosexuals, and not detailing the person's sexual activities, there is no rea-
son to focus on news stories detailing only activities when discussing "outing." See supra
note 11.
161 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
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reasoned that state libel laws were relevant and that the standards of
Sullivan applied, by analogy, to the union newsletter. 62 The Court
held that opinions deserve more protection than other forms of ex-
pression. 163 The Court based its decision on the finding that opin-
ions cannot, by definition, be false. 16 4 Thus, one could argue that
any accusation as to a person's sexual orientation is a mere opinion
and therefore not actionable.
In Milkovitch v. LorainJournal Co.,165 however, the Court stated
that opinions do not require a separate constitutional privilege. Be-
cause opinions may imply factual assertions, they are subject to the
standards that the Sullivan line of cases set forth.166 Opinions, if
based on incomplete or incorrect facts, may imply a false assertion
of fact. Using "I think" to introduce such an assertion does not re-
lieve the statement of its factual implications. As the dissent, how-
ever, reminds us: "Although statements of opinion may imply an
assertion of a false and defamatory fact, they do not invariably do
SO."I°6 Consequently, the wording of the news piece will largely de-
termine its ability to pass as an opinion. Since "outing" implies fac-
tual determinations, the necessary legal analysis must start within
the context of the Court's methodology of defamation.
3. "Outing" Disrupts Defamation's Public/Private Dichotomy
Reputation and defamation law are based on a notion of the
public figure, but sexual orientation disrupts the underlying episte-
mology of a private/public dichotomy. Gertz established the vague
definition that one becomes a public figure either because of general
notoriety or through participation in a particular controversy. 68
162 Id at 272. The union newsletter referred to employees who refused to join the
union as "scabs." Id. at 267.
163 Id. at 284. This decision also led the American Law Institute to change its view
of opinions in defamatory actions. See TRIBE, supra note 65, at 865 n.22; W. Page Kee-
ton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1221, 1245-59 (1976).
164 Austin, 418 U.S. at 284 ("the most repulsive speech enjoys immunity provided it
falls short of a deliberate or reckless untruth") (quoting Linn v. United Plant Guard
Workers of America, Local 114, 383 U.S. 53, 63 (1966)).
165 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
166 Id. at 2705. ("... expressions of'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objec-
tive fact."). The Court was responding to the view that Gertz stood for a wholesale defa-
mation exception. The Court in Gertz had stated that although "there is no such thing as
a false idea ... there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Opinion is contrasted with fact, and
opinions are protected, while statements concerning facts are actionable. This is the
rule adopted by section 566 of the RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS (1977), which
states that opinions are not actionable unless they imply the allegation of undisclosed
defamatory facts. See generally, Frederick F. Schauer, Language, Truth, and the First Amend-
ment: An Essay in Memory of Harry Canter, 64 VA. L. REV. 263 (1978).
167 Milkovitch, 110 S. Ct. at 2709.
168 The definition of "public figure" was parsed into concepts of a limited purpose
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The Gertz Court noted that a public figure is someone capable of
having a "special prominence in the resolution of public ques-
tions." 169 In addition, the Court strongly suggested that a state-
ment is protected only if it concerns that which makes the plaintiff a
public figure; 170 the Court stated that the general notoriety public
figure would not be presumed a "public personality for all aspects of
his life." 171 Sexual orientation is an element of a public person that
has no inherently public quality.' 72 Thus, to establish a defense in
an "outing" suit, a defendant would have to show that the statement
went to the plaintiff's public character.' 73 However, if one uses the
Court's test concerning public figures and public issues, sexual ori-
entation as a mental or psychological state does not fit into either
the public figure or public issue category and would not contribute
to the public character of an individual.
Proponents of "outing" would argue that the very nature of
"outing" concerns a person's public character. The "outed" person
is a public figure, and gay activists intend to make that person a role
model.' 74 As a result, information about sexual orientation is con-
stitutive of the person's publicness. Conversely, the "outed" plain-
tiff would argue that such a position is mere bootstrapping; sexual
orientation may be made public but it is not a public attribute in and
of itself. Although arguments exist on both sides, the debate illus-
trates the problems inherent in the rigid dichotomy of pub-
lic/private spheres when sexual orientation is at issue.
Consequently, "outing" requires the Court to rethink its definitions
and general purpose public figure. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52; see TRME, supra note 65, at
871-88.
169 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351.
170 Id4 at 352 (a court must look "to the nature and extent of an individual's partici-
pation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation"). In Time, Inc. v.
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court decided that a prominent socialite was not a
general purpose public figure even though she was generally famous and had easy access
to the media. In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749
(1985), the Court used the policy rationale of Sullivan to hold that for private plaintiffs
the issue must involve a topic of general public concern. Id. at 755-56. The perpetuation
of the Sullivan policy rationale only makes sense if the definition of a general purpose
public figure in Gertz is limited to "all purposes" dealing with matters of public concern.
This vagueness of the Gertz definition of public figure explains why the Court has failed
to find a public figure in any of its cases since Gertz.
171 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
172 For a discussion of how sexuality differs from sexual activities, and how "outing"
focuses on sexuality, see supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
173 In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), the Court's holding stems from
the evaluation that gossip about the rich and famous is not a matter of legitimate public
interest. Id. at 454-55. Consequently, it is hard to see how the topic of "outing" could
generate any First Amendment protection even if the plaintiff is a general purpose pub-
lic figure.
174 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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of the public and the private, and whether that dichotomy remains
useful.
B. "Outing" and the Rethinking of Privacy
1. Sexual Orientation's Relationship to Piivacy
Sexuality not only calls for a rethinking of the notion of defama-
tion, 1 75 but also demands a reassessment of privacy protection. The
Supreme Court decided whether the right of privacy extended to
homosexuality in Bowers v. Hardwick,176 a case challenging the Geor-
gia state statute criminalizing sodomy. Though recognizing the
right to privacy, the majority held that homosexual activities did not
fall within the purview of protected private, intimate relations.1 77
The precedential scope of the holding has generated great de-
bate,17 8 and the opinion has thrown the right of privacy into doubt.
Read narrowly, the opinion only states that the privacy right ex-
cludes the "right [of] homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual
sodomy."' 179 Given such a reading, the precedential force of the
opinion, while seemingly of narrower scope, still bears on the issue
of "outing," because the Court denied that the right to privacy pro-
tects homosexuality.' 80 On the other hand, the dissent read the
Bowers issue broadly as raising the general right to be let alone.'8 1
Either interpretation of Bowers demonstrates the Court's unwilling-
ness to recognize a sphere of privacy for homosexuality. Further-
175 See supra notes 136-74 and accompanying text.
176 478 U.S. 186 (1986). For a general discussion of Bowers and privacy rights, see
Norman Vieira, Hardwick and the Right of Privacy, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1181 (1988).
177 The right of privacy encompasses rights related to "family, marriage, or procrea-
tion," not the right of "homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy." Bowers, 478 U.S. at
191. In his dissent, however, Justice Blackmun stressed that the issue was not about
sodomy but about the "right to be let alone." Id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis,J., dissenting)).
178 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 105, at 116-26 (no general right to privacy exists in the
Constitution); TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1428 ("it becomes clear that a proscription on
private acts of sodomy should not survive"); Daniel 0. Conkle, The Second Death of Sub-
stantive Due Process, 62 IND. L. J. 215, 216 (1987) ("Deviating sharply from the Court's
own precedents, Bowers necessarily works to undercut the theoretical underpinnings of
the modern Court's substantive due process doctrine."); Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers
v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 648, 649, 656 (1987)
(arguing that the case is merely "judicial self-indulgence" and represents the Court's
"collective distaste of [homosexuality]"); Sunstein, supra note 136, at 1163 ("The disa-
greement over the meaning of Hardwick contains a larger lesson for the relationship
between the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.").
179 Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192. See TRIBE, supra note 65, at 1422-29 (proposing this
narrow reading).
180 For a discussion of the relationship between constitutional issues of privacy and
the tort of invasion of privacy, see supra text accompanying notes 100-03; for a discus-
sion of the distinction between limiting governmental action and private action, see infra
note 199.
181 See supra note 177.
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more, since the Court did not differentiate sexual orientation from
homosexual activities, when faced with an "outed" plaintiff, the
court might have difficulty defining the contours of the private self
that the press allegedly invaded. Sexual orientation may unsettle
the Court's basic methodological approach to invasion of privacy
suits and force the Court to question the parameters of privacy.
Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co. 18 2 was the first case that forced a
court to rethink and adjudicate invasion of privacy, sexual orienta-
tion, and freedom of the press. Oliver Sipple, an ex-Marine,
grabbed the arm of Sara Jane Moore when she attempted to shoot
President Ford.18 3 After Sipple's act of heroism, the San Francisco
Chronicle published the story, which exposed details of Sipple's life
as a prominent member of the gay community in San Francisco. 184
Finding the story offensive to his private life, Sipple sued the paper
for invasion of privacy, alleging that the defendant, without authori-
zation, published private facts that led to family ostracism and social
embarrassment.18 5 The court held that in order to constitute an in-
vasion of privacy, the information disclosed must be private and its
public exposure must be offensive. 18 6 In Sipple's case, the court de-
termined that his sexuality was public knowledge.' 8 7 Additionally,
the court stated that because the publication was truthful, the defen-
dant only needed to show that the story was newsworthy to negate
the invasion of privacy claim. '88 The court relied on Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn 189 for its balancing of the freedom of the press against
the individual's privacy.' 90 The paper argued that the article legiti-
mated gay people and was "prompted by legitimate political consid-
erations."' 19 1 The court held that the story was newsworthy.
Sipple was the first "outing" case to go to trial,' 92 and as such, it
182 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
183 Id. at 666.
184 Id. ("A husky ex-marine who was a hero in the attempted assassination of Presi-
dent Ford emerged Wednesday as a prominent figure in the gay community.") (quoting
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1975).
185 Id. at 667.
186 Id. ("[T]he facts disclosed must be private... [and] must be [facts] which would
be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person.").
187 "[A]ppellant's homosexual orientation and participation in gay community activ-
ities had been known by hundreds .. " Id. at 669.
188 "[A] truthful publication is protected if (1) it is newsworthy and (2) it does not
reveal facts so offensive as to shock the community['s] notions of decency." Id.
189 420 U.S. 469 (1975). For discussion of this case, see supra notes 101-03 and
accompanying text.
190 "When the subject-matter of the publicity is of legitimate public concern, there is
no invasion of privacy." Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 668 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D).
191 Id. at 670. (The publication was "not motivated by a morbid and sensational
prying ... but rather [was] prompted by legitimate political considerations.").
192 This case differs from the type of"outing" discussed by the recent trend of news
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illustrates the extent to which courts can consider the press's prob-
ing as newsworthy. Of course, Sipple was known in San Francisco as
a proponent of Harvey Milk and as a man who had thrust himself
and his sexuality into the limelight.1 93 The court focused on Sip-
pie's status as a public figure and, therefore, publication of even
minimally newsworthy facts about him was considered within the
scope of the press's protection.' 94 The court, however, did not at-
tempt to discuss the issue of sexuality in the context of privacy be-
cause the plaintiff's sexual orientation was already public and,
therefore, privacy was not an issue.195
Although plaintiffs have brought no other cases of "outing,"
the numerous instances of gay newspapers "outing" famous people
suggest a strong likelihood for future litigation and a need for
courts to reassess invasion of privacy analysis. The Sipple court
never addressed the question of whether a plaintiff, whose sexual
orientation is not public knowledge, could bring a successful suit.
Consequently, although the court discusses sexual orientation and
privacy, the Sipple decision offers no answer to whether the sexual
orientation of a public figure is generally a private fact. Future
courts will have to systematically address the specialized issue of
sexuality when confronting these cases of invasion of privacy. Sex-
ual orientation also may prove particularly challenging to the preex-
isting categories that the Supreme Court has set forth to determine
invasion of privacy suits.
2. "Outing". The Court's Rethinking of the Privacy Sphere
In the area of invasion of privacy, sexual orientation unsettles
the Supreme Court's categorical jurisprudence of the mutually ex-
clusive public and private spheres. 196 Privacy is the line that defines,
as well as the mechanism that regulates, the relationship between
the individual and society, 197 but the precise contours of the con-
articles. See supra notes 10-14. The difference is that "outing" has been equated with
the practice of gay papers discussing one's sexuality. This difference is important be-
cause it focuses on the reasons why the article is written, and in Sipple, the court's deter-
mination of invasion of privacy focuses on whether it is newsworthy or mere gossip. Of
course, though a national newspaper, the San Francisco Chronicle does have a large gay
readership, and therefore one could argue that this is an example of "outing."
193 Sipple, 201 Cal. Rptr. at 669.
194 "[Tlhere is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to in-
formation about the plaintiff which is already public .. " Id.
195 The court never addressed the issue of defamation because Sipple never raised
it. Outing cases may very well raise both concerns.
196 For a discussion of the Court's jurisprudential approach to privacy, see supra
notes 104-35 and accompanying text.
197 See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421, 423-25 (1980).
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cept remain vague.'9 8 The First Amendment, however, is the major
constitutional factor determining the scope of the privacy right in
the context of the press. 199 This constitutional dimension has
caused the Court to define the scope of privacy as a balance between
the private attributes of an individual and whether those facts are of
any public concern.200 Although facts about a public figure might
belong in the realm of public concern, a case of "outing" raises the
issue of sexual orientation, which need not ever be realized in public
activities, and seems to have little relation to public issues. The is-
sue of "outing" disrupts the Court's sharp dichotomy of the public
and private. The sexual orientation of a public figure,20 ' like
thoughts or beliefs, need not be part of public activity or of a per-
son's public presence. 20 2 Newspaper stories about a person being
seen in a gay bar are different from stories commenting on that per-
son's sexuality. 20 3 Given the Court's balancing of public and private
concerns, one could argue that if there were to be an area where the
newsworthiness of the press ends, it should end with the mental
198 Brandeis and Warren defined the privacy tort as the legal power to control the
dissemination of information about oneself. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 104, at 196.
For discussion that reveals the fundamental vagueness of privacy, see Raymond
Wacks, The Poverty of "Privacy", 96 LAw Q. REv. 73, 75 (1980) (any attempt to define
privacy is an ultimately futile search); Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human
Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 962 (1964) (As opposed to Prosser's
argument for a four-part division of the term privacy, Bloustein proposes a unitary the-
ory of privacy that is connected to notions of the preservation of human dignity.).
199 Because invasion of privacy is a tort, there is some difficulty in equating the com-
mon law notion of privacy with the constitutional principle. Although both are based on
the requirements of balancing private facts against the public concern for knowledge,
the crucial distinction is that the common law tort operates to control private action,
while the constitutional right is at least indirectly a limitation on governmental action.
See Note, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amendment Rights in Public Disclosure
Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1385, 1409-10 (1976).
200 See Cox Broadcasting, Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,495 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill
385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). Both cases represent the Court's desire to maintain the di-
chotomy first set forth by Brandeis and Warren that privacy involves the tension be-
tween concealing personal facts and the public's right to know. For further discussion of
Hill, see supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. For further discussion of Cox, see
supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
201 "Outing" concerns only the sexual orientation of public figures. For a definition
of public figures, see the discussion of Gertz, supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
Because the gay papers that practice "outing" have political agendas of promoting role
models, they have no need to prey on private citizens and their secret lives. Conse-
quently, in the case of "outing" and privacy, the issue involves, in part, private facts
about public figures that are of public concern, but the problem concerns the difficulty
of placing the concept of sexual orientation somewhere in the dichotomy.
202 Cf Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(court denied the invasion of privacy claim because the plaintiff's private fact, his sexual-
ity, was already public due to his activities). See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
203 For further discussion of this difference and the reasons "outing" concerns only
issues of sexuality, not sexual activity, see supra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
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processes of a person.204 Further, the possibility for falsity is great
when discussing something as nebulous as sexual orientation, and
therefore dissemination of falsity diminishes the potential newswor-
thiness of the publication. 20 5 Privacy is necessary for democratic
reasons because it exemplifies personal autonomy.20 6 The notion of
a representative democracy is fundamentally based on the idea of
people forming preferences and judgments-the freedom of
thought. 20 7 Allowing the press to enter the minds of its citizens
erodes that freedom of thought. One commentator has said that the
invasion of privacy intrudes upon the "intimacy and inner space
necessary to individuality and human dignity." 20 8 -When newspa-
pers "out" someone by publishing that person's sexual orientation,
they may violate the private and personal freedom of individuality.
Newspapers engaging in "outing" would argue that the issue is
not about privacy but about secrecy, and, .therefore, because it is
secrecy they hope to dispel, the public/private dichotomy may not
apply. 20 9 "Outers" would argue that secrecy inequitably applies to
gay people and that society requires the secrecy of homosexuals.
2 10
In response, "outing" breaks through that secrecy and forces peo-
204 The Court has held that activities taking place within one's mind are beyond
government control. See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973) ("fanta-
sies of a drug addict are his own and beyond the reach of government"); Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) (the government cannot "control the moral con-
tent of a person's thoughts"). Though these cases also concern governmental intrusion
into an individual's privacy, the underlying philosophy of these cases seems to be that a
person has autonomy over his or her mind. "Outing" would demand that the press, as
an agent of the public concern, also has no right of access to the mind. Because sexual-
ity is a mental or psychological state, the topic of sexual orientation would seemingly be
outside the scope of the press's freedom.
205 The policy behind the expansive freedom of the press lies in the idea of promot-
ing the free exchange of ideas and criticisms of public officials that are necessary for a
democracy. For a discussion of truth and freedom of the press, see supra note 64 and
accompanying text. Thus, if the potential for falsity is great, then its publication has less
public value according to the constitution because the ideas sought to be disseminated
potentially have no inherent value.
206 In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court stated that certain
privacy rights are included in the "penumbras" of rights emanating from "guarantees in
the Bill of Rights," and those rights are the foundation of democracy. Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 484.
207 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-77 (1964) (discussion of the
necessity for free trade in ideas through speech and how this is the foundation of
democracy).
208 Edward J. Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and
the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. Rav. 41, 53 (1974).
209 See Signorile, supra note 12, at 45.
210 See MOHR, supra note 136, at 98-100 (Mohr, although not an "outer," argues that
the lack of gay characters in television and the fact that public kissing is socially allowed
only among heterosexuals are two examples of how homosexuals are relegated to se-
crecy within our culture).
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ple to confront their unsubstantiated fears of gay people. 21 l
Although this argument may be appealing on a social level, it fails to
confront its legal inadequacies. The Court has never differentiated
secrecy from privacy, 212 and Professor Richard Posner has argued
that secrecy is one distinct interest that privacy encompasses. 213 Se-
crecy concerns the concealment of information, and it is this sense
of privacy that Professor Posner argues underlies the federal Privacy
Act21 4 and most state statutes, because they limit the personal infor-
mation to which the public has access. 215 Consequently, although a
political or theoretical reason may exist for discussing secrecy, no
legal basis for a distinction between privacy and secrecy exists.
3. "Outing's" Ability to Invade Privacy
This Note has assumed that if an "outing" were true, a court
would still have to redefine the private and public dichotomy in or-
der to support a claim of invasion of privacy. In four recent cases,
however, the Supreme Court has left open the question of whether
truthful speech can ever invade one's privacy.216 Though the Court
denied recovery in each case, it read the circumstances of the cases
narrowly and, therefore, presented some possibility for future re-
covery for invasions due to truthful speech. In the first case, Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,217 a television report mentioned a rape
victim's name on the air. The victim's name, however, had already
been mentioned in publicly available trial records. 218 Although the
victim was not a public figure, the Court held that the First Amend-
ment protected the press in cases where public records supplied the
211 See Should the Closet be Forced Open, CHI. TRIB., May 6, 1990, at 3 (public figures
exposed as gay establishes the gay presence in society and presents it as normal and
prevalent).
212 When the Court interpreted the record-keeping requirements of the Bank Se-
crecy Act of 1970, it saw privacy as the relevant issue, although the Act itself referred to
secrecy. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,
416 U.S. 21 (1974).
213 RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS oFJUSTICE 299-309 (1981). Posner's analysis
stems from reading federal and state statutes and the way they use the terms secrecy and
privacy.
214 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1988).
215 POSNER, supra note 213, at 299-301.
216 See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97 (1979); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977);
Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). For a discussion of these cases
and the Court's present view of truthful speech and its potential ability to invade pri-
vacy, see Edelman, supra note 103, at 1197-1233 (stating that these four cases represent
the Court's view of the potential for truthful speech invading privacy, although he never
discussed these cases in terms of their importance for "outing" suits).
217 420 U.S. 469 (1975). For a general discussion of the case, see Zimmerman, supra
note 49, at 303-06.
218 Cox, 420 U.S. at 472.
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news story: "publishing the contents of public records [is] simply
not within the reach of... privacy actions. ' 219 This narrow holding
avoided the larger constitutional issue of whether truthful speech
generally could invade privacy.220
Similarly, in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing,22 1 the Court affirmed
the protected nature of truthful press publications. Here, a newspa-
per published the name of a juvenile murderer; the paper had ob-
tained the suspect's name from the police.222 The Court held that
because the police had freely divulged the assailant's name at the
scene of the crime, it was in the public domain, and that once
"truthful information was . . . in the public domain[,] the court
could not constitutionally restrain its dissemination." 223 The Court
admitted that its holding in the case was narrow, as it again con-
strued a case to apply only to a particular fact situation.224
In Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court,225 the Court again
failed to write an opinion that broadly addressed the balance be-
tween truthful press information and the privacy of the individual.
Petitioner's three newspapers in Oklahoma City published the name
and photograph of a child charged with second-degree murder.226
The newspapers acquired this information lawfully when attending
the boy's detention hearings; the "name and picture of the juvenile
... were 'publicly revealed in connection with the prosecution of the
crime.' ",227 As in the other two cases, the Court skirted the larger
constitutional issue with a restrictive holding: courts cannot pro-
hibit the press from "truthfully publishing information [already] re-
leased to the public." 228 In keeping with Cox and Daily Mail, the
Court merely established that once information becomes public
knowledge, violation of a privacy interest is not possible because
that privacy no longer exists.
The Court's most recent analysis of the ability of truthful publi-
cations to invade privacy came in Florida Star v. B.J.F. 29 Police in
219 Id at 494.
220 Edelman refers to this case, as well as Smith, as the Court's avoidance of a colli-
sion between the press and the individual, a collision that, according to Edelman, oc-
curred in Florida Star (discussed infra notes 229-36 and accompanying text). Edelman,
supra note 103, at 1197-1202.
221 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
222 Id. at 99.
223 Id. at 103. Edelman sees this decision as part of the Court's movement toward
establishing its "lawfully obtained" doctrine. Edelman, supra note 103, at 1202.
224 Smith, 443 U.S. at 105.
225 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
226 Id. at 309.
227 Id. at 311.
228 Id. at 310 (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975)).
229 491 U.S. 524 (1989). For a thorough discussion of this case and the cases lead-
ing up to it, see Edelman, supra note 103.
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Florida disclosed a rape victim's name in a departmental report that
was later placed in the press room. 230 A Florida statute prohibited
publication of the names of sexual assault victims in public docu-
ments.23' Ignoring the law, the Florida Star published the name by
copying the entire report.23 2 The Supreme Court reversed a deci-
sion against the paper noting that the information was "lawfully ob-
tained." 233 The Court, emphasizing its narrow holding, stated that
it did "not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitu-
tionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy
within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by
the press." 23 4 Again, the Court failed to address the constitutional
issue of when truthful speech may invade privacy and to establish
any applicable legal standard.23 5
The status of the law after Florida Star may allow the Court to
accommodate "outing" without trying to fit it into the Court's rigid
categories of privacy. One commentator has argued that if the press
legally obtains information, then no available sanction can be im-
posed against them.23 6 This argument is flawed, however, because
the commentator fails to read the Florida Star opinion as narrowly as
the Court read the state privacy statute and fails to see this case in
conjunction with the previous three cases. In all four cases, the in-
formation published fell, arguably, within the public domain. In Cox
and Florida Star, the information was in a public record. In Oklahoma
and Daily Mail, the press obtained the information from the police
who acted as public officials disseminating public information.
These cases, however, focus less on how the information was ob-
tained than on the status of that information when obtained. Even if
they support protection of "lawfully obtained" material, that does
not mean, as some critics suggest, that the reign of the press is infi-
nite.23 7 In the area of sexuality, for example, the notion of lawfully
obtained information is problematic if applicable at all. Given the
internalized nature of the information, 238 if the press must obtain
230 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 527.
231 Id. at 564.
232 Id. at 527.
233 Id. at 541.
234 Id. Edelman discusses this passage as indicating a limitation on the Court's hold-
ing, but also notes that the Court provided "little legal guidance about the applicable
legal standard" that results from this case. Edelman, supra note 103, at 1201.
235 Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 532 ("Our cases have carefully eschewed reaching this
ultimate question [of whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with
the First Amendment].").
236 See Edelman, supra note 103, at 1202-07.
237 Id. at 1198 ("the Court virtually extinguished privacy plaintiffs' chances of recov-
ery"); Zimmerman, supra note 49, at 362.




the information from the person, it is doubtful that the press could
do so legally and yet still suffer a claim of invasion of privacy by that
person.
The Court, by virtue of these narrow holdings, has left open the
possibility of recovery in cases of "outing." If the element favoring
the press is the already public nature of the information, then the
balance of interests may tip in favor of an individual's privacy when
the press has "outed" that individual. 239 When sexual orientation is
at issue, generally no information previously existed in the public
domain from which to generate the claim of homosexuality.240 In
light of the highly personal and internal nature of the topic, one can
imagine a strong democratic interest in preserving these individual
feelings and thoughts. Consequently, when the Court balances the
public interest in knowing this highly speculative information
against the value of protecting the privacy of an individual's mental
and psychological processes, the public's need for such information
seems slight.
III
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO AND REPERCUSSIONS OF
DEFAMATION OR INVASION OF PRIVACY SUITS
BASED ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
A. Solutions for a Successful "Outing" Claim
1. A Successful Defamation Suit
If the Court allows a claim based on sexual orientation to suc-
ceed, repercussions may result, both in terms of future cases and
constitutional values. As this Note has set forth, the viability of a
defamation suit based on "outing" turns on the inability of the
Court's methodology to accommodate an element of sexuality that
does not fit within the rigid categories of truth and falsity. 24 1 In-
stead of seeing defamation in these rigid terms that might prevent a
claim based on sexual orientation, the Court must realize that cer-
tain issues do not fall squarely within either category. Conse-
quently, the Court must develop the capacity to allow suits that
239 The notion of balancing comes from these four cases in which the Court bal-
anced the right to privacy against information already public and determined that the
balance was in favor of the press because, in effect, there was no privacy interest to
maintain. See Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533; Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 103; Oklahoma, 430
U.S. at 310; Cox, 420 U.S. at 496. For a discussion of balancing in Florida Star, see
Edelman, supra note 103, at 1211-18.
240 This is not obvious. If sexuality does not equal sexual activities, one would have
had to make his or her private mental state known publicly; given Mohr's notion of the
secrecy of homosexuals, MOHR, supra note 136, at 98-100, it is doubtful that any infor-
mation, other than speculation, could be in the public domain.
241 See supra notes 137-60 and accompanying text.
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appear barred based on conventional epistemology. "Outing" calls
on the Court to rethink the truth/falsity dichotomy. 242 Thus, the
Court's standard of proof must change to accommodate the hybrid
status of sexual orientation which defies easy categorization. Re-
quiring a plaintiff to prove falsity is unrealistic when that issue may
not apply, or at the very least lies beyond the scope of proof.243
One procedural mechanism to circumvent this problem of
proof is to require the plaintiff to establish merely a prima facie
showing of the falsity of the publication and then have the defen-
dant rebut it. This method may still evoke the same difficulties in
proving the veracity of an "outing" claim, although perhaps to a
lesser degree. Alternatively, courts may wish to dispense with the
truth/falsity standard altogether and instead return to the older
common-law notion of reputation.244 By only requiring a showing
that the publication damaged the plaintiff's reputation, without
questioning the publication's truthfulness, the plaintiff could suc-
ceed in a defamation suit, yet avoid the seemingly endemic proof
problems.
Another method to avoid the problems of the Court's method-
ological approach to defamation is to characterize "outing" claims
as publicity rights suits. Closely akin to the notion of a property
right in reputation, publicity rights legally recognize the value of
one's name, voice, or personality.245 To recover for such a viola-
tion, plaintiffs need to establish a prima facie showing of the unau-
thorized use of their names or likenesses for commercial purposes
and that this use violated the individual's right to privacy. 246 Plain-
tiffs could claim publicity rights since "outing" deals with the repu-
tation of public figures and through the exercise of these publicity
rights, plaintiffs could avoid defamation's methodological difficul-
ties. The right of publicity avoids discussion of the defamation cate-
gories of truth/falsity and public/private, which have proven so
problematic for issues of sexual orientation.
242 See supra notes 140-51 and accompanying text.
243 See supra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
244 See supra notes 34-44 and accompanying text.
245 For cases detailing the unauthorized use of one's name or picture, see Carson v.
Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983); Haelan Laboratories v.
Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
246 See Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (where defen-
dant does not use the name for commercial gain, there is no actionable claim of publicity
rights); Fairfield v. American Photocopy, 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955) (plaintiff is
entitled to recovery based on invasion of one's right to be let alone); Palmer v.
Schonhorn, 232 A.2d 458 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (right of privacy involves right
to be free from unmandated appropriation or exploitation of one's personality). For a
general discussion of the right of publicity, see Patti T. Cotten, Note, Torts-The Right of
Publicity--Protecting A Celebrity's Identity, 52 TENN. L. REV. 123 (1984).
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The Supreme Court only considered the conflict between the
First Amendment and publicity rights once in Zacchini v. Scripps-How-
ard Broadcasting.247 In Zacchini the plaintiff claimed that a news tele-
cast of a "human cannonball" act violated the right to publicity
when the telecast illegally videotaped the plaintiff's entire perform-
ance. 248 The Court stated that the right to publicity did not directly
involve the First Amendment; when defendants use a newsworthy
plaintiff's name or likeness for their own commercial gain, they may
not elicit constitutional protections. 249 The Court, however, failed
to specify the precise relationship between publicity rights and free-
dom of the press. 250 Consequently, publicity rights- still present an
open constitutional question.
In the case of "outing," given society's discrimination against
homosexuals, 25' one could argue that an individual's success as a
public figure suffers damage from a public revelation of homosexu-
ality.252 Heterosexuality is implicitly a part of the financially or so-
cially lucrative public image.253 When a newspaper discusses a
public figure's hidden sexuality, it sells newspapers at the expense
of that person's own marketability. In addition, one could charac-
terize "outing" as an unauthorized portrayal of the person. The
newspaper's appropriation of the person's public image, therefore,
seems to violate the right to publicity.
2. A Successful Invasion of Privacy Suit
Successful privacy suits based on "outings" similarly require
247 433 U.S. 562 (1977). For discussion of this case, see Peter L. Felcher & Edward
L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity, and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE LJ. 1577,
1590-91 (1979).
248 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-64.
249 Id. at 578. The Court did state that in this case the telecast was not immunized
by the First Amendment because the "broadcast [was of] a performer's entire act with-
out his consent." Il at 575. Although not a clear standard, the holding does suggest
that there is a constitutional limitation on the extent of publicity rights.
250 Id. at 575.
251 See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (1988) (immigration may deny entry into the United
States based on "sexual deviation"); Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law
Center v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987) (school authorities denied a gay
student organization official recognition); EDrrORS OF THE HARVARD LAw REVIEW, SEX-
UAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAw (1990).
252 See "Closet" Politicians Targeted, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 29, 1990 at 11 (the debate focuses
on gay militants threatening to "out" politicians who vote against gay causes). The es-
sence of this article, and of the gays' threat, underscores the knowledge that public ex-
posure can ruin a public career.
253 This claim is supported, in part, by studies showing the amount of employment
discrimination against gays and lesbians which in turn implies that one is made generally
more marketable by presenting an image or facade of heterosexuality. See MOHR, supra
note 136, at 22-39 (lower social status of gays and lesbians due to society's bigotries);
Rivera, supra note 29, at 805-29 (employment discrimination against gays and lesbians).
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the Court to rethink its private/public epistemology and its inability
to fit sexuality into the dichotomy. For invasion of privacy claims,
the Court should recognize that although certain issues appear pub-
lic, when characterized differently-i.e., as sexual orientation instead
of sexual activity-a supposedly public event may actually be a pri-
vate aspect of the individual. Consequently, even in the case of a
public figure, some aspects of an individual's life defy any connec-
tion to that individual's public character.254
Policy concerns also may provide a basis for a successful inva-
sion of privacy claim. In reading the Florida Star line of cases nar-
rowly, one notices that the Court has not constitutionally restricted
the possibility of an invasion of privacy suit when the information is
truthful. If the decisions protecting truthful speech are read as ap-
plying only to information already in the public domain, one must
determine the status of the law by looking to policy. In cases where
the information is already public, 255 the policies of privacy do not
apply. The need for control over the self and protection of auton-
omy2 56 does not exist when the information is already public. Con-
sequently, any balancing against the First Amendment results in the
protection of the press.
B. Repercussions
Although fitting sexual orientation into the legal framework for
defamation and invasion of privacy suits calls for the Court to ex-
pand its methodological approach, these changes would not seri-
ously undermine the core First Amendment principles. From the
constitutional perspective, the free exchange of information should
not be inhibited.2 57 Admittedly, successful "outing" cases would
limit the press's access to certain private information. The real con-
cern, however, is not that the press will have limitations, but
whether these limitations will have damaging effects on constitu-
tional values. One might argue that allowing people to bring
charges for the publication of their sexual orientation may have a
certain "chilling" effect on the press. 25 8 This, however, seems
doubtful. In cases of "outing" and defamation suits, the press
would already be aware of the possible falsity of the claim simply
because the press can never obtain definite proof in this area. In
invasion of privacy suits the question is more difficult. One might
254 See supra notes 168-74 and accompanying text.
255 For a discussion of the Court's failure to determine what degree of "publicness"
constitutes "public" information, see supra note 170.
256 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
257 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964).
258 See Schaffner, supra note 55, at 443.
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argue that because no bright line rule results from such an exten-
sion of the privacy right, it's vagueness may "chill" the press. This
retort also lacks merit because of sexuality's position on the spec-
trum of privacy concerns. If one envisions such a spectrum, and if
sexual orientation is conceived, as this Note argues, as an internal
mental disposition, then sexual orientation constitutes the most pri-
vate interest of an individual. Nothing about sexual orientation ever
need become public. Consequently, if the Court, as it suggested in
Florida Star,259 does imagine a realm of privacy protected from even
truthful speech, sexual orientation must lie within that realm.
The other concern focuses on the precedential'value of a defa-
mation or invasion of privacy decision that protects the "outed" in-
dividual. Although prophecy is inherently problematic, if the Court
were to decide a case as this Note has suggested, two bright lines
emerge. First, assuming that the news story was in fact true, a suc-
cessful "outing" action would establish a claim for invasion of pri-
vacy by truthful publications. This claim would force the Court to
directly confront a truthful publication's power to invade privacy. 260
However, the Court need not paint this bright line so broadly as to
allow an action against all truthful publications. Only truthful publi-
cations that seek access to the inner workings of a person's mind or
internal thought processes would become actionable on account of
such a ruling. This standard would merely establish a theoretically
undisputable demarcation of the privacy line. In the case of defama-
tion, the Court's line between recklessly false and truthful publica-
tions would still stand. "Outing" merely calls for an exception in
cases that defy this distinction. Like privacy issues, defamation suits
would succeed when the press publishes internal analyses of peo-
ple.261 This argument does not foreclose all discussion of sexuality
since the press could still discuss sexual orientation once a person
reveals it. As a result, the Court would not establish a new basis for
defamation but would instead simply recognize exceptions that can-
not fit within the preexisting decisions.
Given that any such decisions would not radically affect the con-
stitutional climate, the state's interest in preserving the rights of the
259 "We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally pro-
tected, or that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect
the individual from intrusion by the press.... " Florida Star, 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).
260 See supra notes 216-35 and accompanying text.
261 One might argue that this analysis would extend to political figures and their
"political orientation." The argument would further state that if this realm of knowl-
edge were off limits to the press, then a major value of the press-its ability to criticize
political or governmental figures-would be nullified. This contention, however, is with-
out merit. The politics of governmental figures is important in so far as they are acted
upon. Consequently, this "political orientation" would only be of concern to the press if
it were actualized. Sexual orientation, however, need not have any such public element.
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press appears insignificant when balanced against the individual
concerns of personal autonomy and control over the self-two val-
ues inherent in constitutional issues. 262 Balancing this equation is
more difficult, however, when one factors in the politics for "out-
ing" advanced by the gay community. This gay perspective holds
that the state's interest in protecting the press is based on the free-
perhaps vital-exchange of information. Individuals within the gay
community have argued that such exposure is necessary to promote
public awareness, provide young individuals with positive role mod-
els, instill feelings of self-worth in other gay people, and thereby
end homophobia and its resultant hate crimes.263
One might respond that such arguments are political, not legal.
Of course, this ignores everything that the Realists and the Critical
Legal Studies scholars have argued regarding the highly politicized
nature of the law and of the Court in particular.264 A significant
problem with this political argument stems from its lack of a fore-
seeable limit. Any group could legitimately argue that limits on the
press run counter to its concerns. If this became the case, the only
potential limit to the press's freedom would concern private individ-
uals engaging in private acts. If we have a commitment to privacy,
then we must maintain it. "Outing" does not force us to change the
bounds of the privacy right, it merely questions what that right in-
cludes. Supporting the political argument would result in reformu-
lating the boundaries of the category itself every time a new political
issue arose. Thus, if the law is to have any precedential value, the
claims of those who support "outing"must give way to the sounder
legal position of allowing defamation and invasion of privacy suits.
CONCLUSION
This Note has analyzed the difficulties that courts and attorneys
will face when presented with "outing" claims of defamation and
invasion of privacy. The Supreme Court's present methodological
approach to defamation and privacy suits cannot accommodate is-
sues of sexual orientation. This Note proposes that the Court dis-
pense with its categorical analysis and instead, for defamation,
return to the common-law malice standard based on reputation, and
for invasion of privacy, recognize an internal, mental sphere of the
individual where the press does not have constitutional protection.
262 See supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
263 For a discussion of these political views, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text.
264 See e.g., RICHARD ABEL, THE POLITICS OF INFORMALJUSTICE (1982); ROBERTO UN-
GER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); Karl Llewellyn, Law and the Modem Mind, 31
COLUM. L. REV. 90 (1931); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies and Constitutional Law: An
Essay in Deconstruction, 36 STAN. L. REV. 623 (1984).
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In both cases, this Note urges a limitation on the freedom of the
press, but also argues that any such curtailment of the press's free-
dom does not undermine the First Amendment. This Note merely
asks for a rethinking of the balance between the rights of the press
and the rights of those individuals subjected to that press.
Jon E. Grant t
t I wish to thank Professor Steven Shiffrin and Frank Kulbaski for all of their help-
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